The Building Durable Peace Project: Enhancing Interagency Relationships in Peacebuilding – Intra-organizational Dynamics

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ABSTRACT

Within today's complex systems of peacebuilding, a wide range of military and civilian agencies attempt to establish effective working relationships in order to achieve greater impact through their combined efforts. These attempts at coordination have had mixed results, and this research examines the question of coordination at the intra-organizational level, using organization development theory. Despite the dissimilarity of the agencies examined herein, cross-sectoral themes regarding intra-organizational dynamics emerged. Asked to reflect upon positive and negative experiences of intra-agency coordination, as well as on improvements towards a "desired state" for their organizations in this context, interviewees expressed a need for trust in and a clear mandate from leadership, as well as a need to professionalize peacekeeping operations and to design career path structures that provide job security and encourage employee retention. The necessity for increased internal and cross-sectoral professional development as well as improved capacity to capture and share hard-learned lessons from within these different sectors also emerged. Investigation of leadership and communication dynamics, organizational culture, reward/status systems and conflict resolution systems by means of semi-structured interviews provided the data for this research.

1.0   INTRODUCTION

Organization Development (OD) theory may aid the examination of intra-agency coordination within organizations working in complex peacebuilding operations by providing explanation of complex individual and group interactions. OD has become increasingly relevant in the 21st century, as joint ventures and globalization require organizations to be blended or aligned for common objectives (Schein, 2009). Interpersonal and group dynamics within any organization exert powerful influences on the organization's objectives and outcomes, which may in turn affect the ability of the organization to work with other agencies. Organizations use the collective skills of different individuals in order to produce specific products, objectives or services. Particularly with large organizations, employment in one of its sections does not necessarily imply common goals, career paths or value systems with other sections. These factors may vary widely between headquarters and field levels of employment. As an organization increases in size, and especially where there are large physical distances between offices, there is a concomitant increase in the complexity of interactions between those working together (Schein, 2009). These interactions reflect unique cultures, which help provide stability and certainty for the individuals within the cultural groups. These complex cultures run deep within the organization and become entrenched and hard to change, and also form distinctive subcultures within different levels of the organization. They frame the way those within the organization learn, think and interact with each other and with the world around them. Differing shared assumptions, norms, habits and values in these cultures and sub-cultures may affect the ability of the organizations to coordinate and partner with other organizations (Schein, 1997).

Within complex peace operations, governments, international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) security forces and multilateral organizations attempt to coordinate their efforts for efficient and effective actions, yet their diverse organizational cultures may adversely affect the impact of their efforts. In this research effort, five core themes of organizational dynamics were examined, including leadership and culture. Communication methods and conflict resolution systems were examined, as well as reward and status systems. This study reviewed four representative organizations: the Department of National Defence/Canadian Forces (DND/CF) for the security sector, Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) as representative of a bilateral donor agency, the Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere International (CARE) as a representative International Non-Governmental Organization (INGO) and the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) as a multi-lateral organization. Cascading sampling was used to find 28 individuals for the interview sessions. The semi-structured interview questions were discussed in-person, by telephone and via Skype. The results were clustered into core themes for internal and cross-thematic analysis.

The five core themes are outlined using OD theory as a framework, focused mainly on Schein's cultural theories, which investigate assumptive cultural beliefs and values that affect the perceptions and behaviours of individuals and groups within organizations (Schein, 1996). Schein's extensive body of work encompasses more than fifty years of study, including in-depth analyses of diverse organizations, and numerous practical applications tested in the development of his theoretical work. His work provides a framework sufficiently robust to encompass the diverse range of organizations reviewed in this work.

1.1   Leadership

Leaders help create and continue the culture of an organization by articulating and reinforcing existing shared assumptions, through the process of paying attention to actions or incidents and through their own behaviour (Schein, 1997). How leaders react in crises, what they define as a crisis, what they reward and punish and even the stories that develop about leaders also affect the organizational culture. Leadership styles in a sub-culture at the headquarters level of an organization may be quite different from the leadership styles in field operations. For example, due to a political or bureaucratic climate at headquarters, leadership at the headquarters level may be competitive, controlling and hierarchical, with few questioning the decisions of the leader. The uncertain and dynamic conditions of field operations may encourage a more collaborative and interdependent leadership style, focused on adapting to problems or changes (Schein, 1996). Leaders of each sub-culture within the organization may consider their groups as key to the success of the organization, which may complicate intra-organizational leadership roles. When different cultures look to improvement of the organization, they also tend to see the most valuable change emerging from their own areas. For example the executive level may see solutions in terms of financial expenditures or restraints. For improvement of an organization to occur, however, comprehensive organizational alignment of objectives for improvement must exist or the changes are unlikely to endure (Schein, 1996).

This research examined questions regarding leadership styles and behaviours that encourage efficient and effective coordination between headquarters (HQ) and the field, and whether or not participants perceived if leadership styles that encourage coordination exist within their organizations. As well, this study asked questions about the leadership position individuals consult when they require effective resolution of issues between HQ and the field. Finally, participants were asked for any narrative of a memorable or inspiring leader that exists within their organizations.

1.2   Communication

Whether negotiating a contract, planning a mission or relaying information, the method and formality of the communication used to coordinate is a critical aspect of its effectiveness. In smaller organizations, where individuals are "functionally familiar" (Schein, 2009, p. 122) with the individuals with whom they work, informal communication may suffice for internal coordination efforts. However with larger organizations, especially when organizations coordinate multiple tasks and disparate cultures over large geographic areas, more formal communication is required. Whether it is by email, a face-to-face conversation, a written memo or a meeting, the substitution of formal procedures and processes replaces personal contact. In interactions between those who have little personal contact, trust may not develop easily and/or the exchanges may be affected by political or individual agendas (Schein, 2009, p. 122). Differences in subtle physical behaviours may also further exacerbate cross-cultural communication. For example, one party may interpret a simple nod as confirmation and acceptance of a particular message while the other party may be simply confirming receipt of the message, not necessarily its acceptance. These nuances of human interaction, while difficult in face-to-face communications, may be distorted or lost completely within a written format, perhaps even more so when using email. This "human element" cannot be easily quantified, and the loss of context and visibility as well as a lack of feedback when using email may exacerbate conflict (Friedman & Currall, 2003). In the context of coordination within large organizations, the importance of face-to-face interactions, which include analysis of physical behaviours, verbal cues, as well as "off the record" conversations, which encourage needed discussion, must not be underestimated. Reliance on technology, such as email, may appear quick and efficient but is not an adequate substitution for face-to-face inter-personal relationships. Where different levels in an organization have different norms for communication, conflict also may develop over assumptions about how vital information should be communicated. For example, email communication may be considered sufficient for a memorandum from head office to the field, but seen as lacking substance if it requires critical actions from field personnel.

This research asked interviewees questions regarding typical internal communications between HQ and the field. It examined perceived difficulties with these forms of communication, as well as skills and knowledge required to attain needed information, beyond the typical communication methods. Reflections regarding the level of interpretation allowed by communication methods were also recorded. Finally, this research inquired into skills and knowledge necessary to establish effective communication.

1.3   Organizational Culture

According to Schein, three management cultures exist within any organization: the executive, operator, and engineer cultures (Schein, 1996). The executive culture includes upper management, CEOs and their subordinates, and also reflects an executive culture external to the organization. In this culture, executives across different organizations tend to have their own assumptions, self-image and focus, and work with and relate to those with the same worldview. For the purpose of this research the term "executive" is used synonymously with "headquarters" (HQ) to refer to levels of upper management across the representative organizations.

The second culture referenced within this work is "operators." Operators refer to a diverse group whose culture develops from operational successes, whatever they may be to each specific organization. Key assumptions involve a belief that this success depends on the skill, commitment and knowledge of the people involved (Schein, 1996, p.13). In the context of this research, personnel in-country who perform the security, development, peacekeeping or humanitarian tasks outlined by policy and mandates from the HQ level of their organizations define the operator culture.

Engineers, the "designers and technocrats who drive the core technologies" (Schein, 1996, p. 9) have an intra-organizational culture that, like executives, is also external to their workplace. Engineers identify with engineers despite their different locations of employment. This subculture has a tendency to hold tacit assumptions that technological innovation or "people-free solutions" (Schein 1996, p. 12) will resolve any problem. While an important aspect of organizational dynamics, the constraints of this initial intra-organizational inquiry did not include analysis of this third culture.

In addition to the three management cultures, organizations also contain numerous internal subcultures that develop around "occupations, product lines, function, geographies and echelons in the hierarchy" (Schein, 2009, p.11). These subcultures encompass group norms and values, as well as subtle differences in behavioural mannerisms, messages conveyed by attire and proximity of physical presence, which may affect communications, perceptions and outcomes (Schein, 1997). Schein categorizes values as "espoused and negotiable values" and "taken-for-granted and non-negotiable values," (Schein, 2009, pp.23-27), which are largely unconscious assumptions that are shared with a group. Other aspects of organizational culture include habits, customs, formal philosophy or mission statement and language use, whether that of different nationalities or merely the contextual variations within a single language. Dissimilar values, worldviews and organizational objectives may distance the cultures within an organization (Schein, 1997). These subcultures may include deep assumptions about an organization's specific engagement in particular operations, or about the involvement of those with whom it needs to collaborate, for example. For an organization to function well changes made to policy or the overarching mission of the organization at a HQ level must be clear and must continue to align with the culture of those employed in an organization (Schein, 2009).

With regard to the wider research question of inter-organizational coordination, Schein has noted circumstances when partnerships between organizations have been found to violate the self-image held by employees, and this "cultural indigestion" (Schein, 2009, p. 42) resulted in employees unwilling and unable to accept the partnership. These differing perspectives might derail attempts at coordination of efforts and are of particular interest when contemplating the vastly different mandates of the security, development, peacekeeping and humanitarian sectors.

The large scale of the representative organizations further complicates their internal coordination attempts. Not only is it difficult to coordinate diverse tasks and responsibilities of large numbers of people, but the groups within an organization may also be working in different geographical locations. Geographically isolated teams may develop their own subcultures and conflict may arise between the different units (Schein, 1997).

Interview questions asked participants about their perceptions of root causes of conflict, issues of trust, and the perceived differences of daily experiences of field and HQ personnel. This research also inquired into existing "grand narratives" about the organizations, or notable persons who defined underlying organizational philosophies. A final question asked for suggestions for improving or encouraging better coordination between the field and HQ.

1.4   Reward and Status Systems

All organizations require and develop reward systems to satisfy employee career and financial needs (Schein, 2009). Bureaucracies establish career paths as well as formal and informal rules and norms for "getting ahead." Reward and status systems may vary significantly, ranging from a sense of satisfaction from "doing good" to monetary compensation to titles and promotions (Schein, 2009). The satisfaction of completing objectives and reward for doing so are important motivators for personnel. Without sufficient feedback via appropriate incentive structures, cultures of indifference or inappropriate competition may evolve. The structure of the

reward system may complicate interactions between headquarters and those in the field. For example, organizations that encourage team work but reward individuals or conversely, that have a "blaming culture" where personal blame is assessed for failure of a group project may create issues around trust and disclosure between levels in an organization (Schein, 2009, p. 50). Large organizations may be slow to respond to change, to encourage innovation or may be political or competitive. Within the field of peacebuilding, continued innovation and evolution of peacebuilding techniques and tools delves into the unknown and has elements of risk. Failure may be a by-product of attempting new ideas and may in fact provide valuable new learning for an organization. Organizational cultures that reward innovative methods and do not punish failures will find more success and progress than those which pay lip service to the concept but continue to encourage the status quo through the use of inadequate performance evaluation and reward systems (Schein, 2009).

Questions within this core theme addressed whether or not participants perceived that their organizations encouraged or discouraged innovation, as well as if the organizations made good use of the knowledge, intelligence and experience of their personnel. Individual participants also commented on the use of contracts, performance review systems and financial compensation.

1.5   Conflict Resolution Systems

Conflict resolution systems provide procedures and tools for organizations to deal with conflict ranging from inter-personal issues to workplace harassment to abuses of power. Schein (2009) notes that conflict often arises from differing views between organizational subcultures, or a misalignment of views between these subcultures and the corporate culture.

Although employees may be taught the established, formal policies, procedures and structures for resolution of workplace conflict, they may find the climate of the organization discourages open discussion of emerging issues or even punishes those who admit to or complain about problems (Folger, Poole & Stutman, 2009). Perceptions of conflict as negative may also affect the ways in which organizations address conflict at a policy level. Fundamentally different perceptions of conflict may affect behaviours and attitudes conducive to effective coordination between organizations. Furthermore, adequate management of organizational conflict increases productivity by providing direct and quick resolution of issues (Thomas, 2000). This improves decision-making by encouraging diverse perspectives to be voiced and discussed. As well, it enhances retention of employees and reduces absenteeism, both of which have related benefits of enhanced organizational loyalty and increased preservation of institutional knowledge (Thomas, 2000). Finally, conflict resolution systems may operate according to formal legal steps, but may also be tempered by moral authority, physical authority and/or the past experiences of those involved in the situation, all of which may vary considerable between field and HQ cultures (Schein, 2009).

This research investigated the perception, availability and opinion of conflict resolution at various levels within the representative organizations. Interview questions also assessed differences between the way conflict was resolved at the headquarters and field levels.

2.0   INTERVIEW RESULTS

2.1   Department of National Defence/Canadian Forces (DND/CF)

The Canadian Department of National Defence (DND) and the Canadian Forces (CF) are separate legal entities, which together provide the Minister of National Defence with recommendations for "the defence of Canada and

of Canadian interests at home and abroad" (About DND/CF, 2011). Responsible to the Minister of National Defence, command of the CF is under the authority of the Chief of Defence Staff, a serving officer, while the Deputy Minister, a civilian who has responsibility for a complex set of policy, resource, and coordination matters, heads the DND. With 28,000 civilian employees and 90,000 Regular and Reserve Force members, the DND/CF is Canada's largest federal government department (About the Canadian Forces, 2011). Interviews included individuals from civilian, reserve and regular forces.

2.1.1 Leadership

According to interviewees, the underlying ethos of Canadian military culture defines leadership not as individuals involved in people- or project- management, but as those who "lead from the front," who are willing to protect and take care of their people, and who do their jobs not for accolades or promotion, but because of a drive to do their mission well and accomplish their objectives. In this culture, compliance to orders may be automatically expected and given, but leaders also earn and inspire compliance as they advance through the ranks, where each promotion involves opportunities to develop leadership skills and earn the trust and respect of fellow members. Field level participants, when asked about coordination of tasks between themselves and headquarters initially stated that coordination was not an issue for lower ranks. It was instead defined as following orders; a culture of compliance of lower ranks to higher.

Interviewees reported that the hierarchical top-down leadership of the DND/CF, whether it is good or bad, fundamentally drives every function within the DND/CF. Field level officers expressed mistrust in leadership that they sometimes perceive has "forgotten its roots" and where policy made from behind the desks of insular officers in headquarters, to be enacted by troops in front of enemy fire may make conditions on the ground "unbelievably bad" at the unit level. Bluntly, one interviewee, reflecting on a HQ reference to Canadian forces as a neutral peacekeeping force, stated, "We're not neutral, so don't say we are: it gets people killed." Where individuals perceive that egos and hidden objectives drive decisions from higher levels to the point of making poor decisions, mistrust palpably changes to a lack of confidence in the decisions made by DND/CF leaders. This lack of confidence creates a rift between the fundamental driving force of the military, leadership, and the membership it leads.

Field level interviewees stated strongly that high-level leadership must spend time in the field, in order to obtain accurate "ground truth" prior to decisions about field level actions. Leaders at HQ are concerned about receiving reliable information on which they can make their decisions, but at high levels are insulated from direct reports. Participants made the link between effective leadership and communication clear: numerous levels of impersonal hierarchy and opportunities for interpretation that exist between field reports and HQ reports create circumstances where HQ may distrust or miss out on vital information. As a result, HQ may be unaware of poor results or problems and consequently may take no action, or inappropriate action. Those in the field who receive no response, or what they consider an inappropriate response based on their assessments question and distrust the actions from HQ.

2.1.2 Communication

Across participants, communication skills were defined as vital to good relationships between levels in the DND/CF. The ability to motivate people and to clearly articulate important information were outlined as necessary skills. Additionally, participants identified that it is important to know with whom to speak, in order to have your message properly received. This unofficial communications chain of command was identified by one participant as "technut" and defined as individuals who facilitate getting the "right information onto the right desk." This unofficial line of communication has developed out of a need to move information more quickly

within a large and slow hierarchical organization; according to one participant, "If I waited for 'the system' to do its job, nothing would ever get done or ever happen."

Lower ranking interviewees reported the use of the chain of command for communication is successful up to the midlevels of the organization. Beyond that, several participants expressed frustration at reports that "disappeared into thin air." For lower level officers, communication appears to be largely one-way, and participants stated that this reduced their ability to complete objectives efficiently. However one high-ranking participant acknowledged the DND/CF is working towards increasing education and sophistication of the working ranks of the military, and that there is a changing acceptance of communication moving up the chain of command as well as back down in interactions that might be considered increasingly collaborative.

Significant differences between high and low ranking officers were voiced in terms of interpretation of communications within the chain of command. Field officers stated there was a great deal of leeway for interpretation in messages between HQ and the field, and expressed considerable frustration with this state of affairs. In comparison, one commanding officer stated there was, "no difference from intention of information to perception: handover of information is detailed."

One participant commented that the DND/CF needed to find ways to more quickly and effectively assimilate the knowledge learned from different levels within the organization, rather than continue to rely on HQ as a top-down disseminator of decisions and policy. The lessons learned from each different operation take time to penetrate such a large and highly hierarchical organization. Participants commented that when those in the field learn lessons that appear appropriate or successful, this information needed to be assimilated more rapidly by higher levels within the organization. This process currently takes a significant length of time, and given the short rotation time of typical missions, each rotation ends up wasting time and energy re-learning basic information.

As a final observation, an interviewee noted that the DND/CF inter-agency interfaces, or liaison officers, which are meant to be a conduit for communications between the DND/CF and other agencies, are often thought of as a "dumping ground for people not doing well in their real job." It was stated that the people in these crucial interface positions rarely receive the training required to do their jobs well and may have little interest in communicating with individuals from different organizational cultures.

2.1.3 Organizational Culture

From the perspective of those in the field, areas of organizational culture relevant to effective internal coordination focused on trust of HQ. While questions asked included interference of hierarchy and rules with task completion, and sources of conflict, the issue of trust surfaced repeatedly. Interviewees stated that due to egos and hidden agendas, "trust is an issue with HQ more often than not." This was more precisely specified as an issue at the strategic level, but not as significantly at the tactical level. Field level participants also stated that HQ should provide greater clarity and transparency in order to facilitate conditions of trust. These comments reflected the opinion that the HQ level is ego-driven, political and bureaucratic, and that these characteristics conflict with traditional core values of integrity, honesty and honour. Even though this ethos is perhaps more "what ought to be" rather than "what is" (English, 2004), this represents a long-standing conflict grounded in a soldier's unlimited liability under control of a bureaucratic and politically focused leadership.

HQ level participants commented that there is a "heavy push for change" within the organization and thus within training and development systems. There is recognition of a need to build domestically, in order to improve internal dynamics before attempts to work with other organizations. An interviewee commented that a key

challenge lies in developing an approach that will improve coordination and bridge the divide between the field and HQ in theatre, as well as the divide between the Canadian military forces and other organizations in theatre. One participant commented that field level officers needed to understand the pressures, restrictions and perspectives placed on HQ level officers, who must also adhere to national policy.

Participants also expressed a belief that field forces "regardless of resources, have a 'can-do' attitude" and will complete objectives despite the bureaucracy and delays from higher up the chain of command." This attitude prevails even when field level personnel do not have the skills and training required to safely complete the objective. An interviewee commented that this attitude comes with a price in the field [of injury and mortality for soldiers]. This attitude remains, despite vastly changed 21st century battle-space conditions. From the comments of the participants, it appears to be a deeply ingrained "can-do" cultural assumption within the Canadian Forces itself, which expects fighting members to accomplish many of these new objectives, regardless of training, resources or mandate. This attitude may be commendable, but it enhances unrealistic expectations that, without adequate training, cannot be met by Canadian Forces personnel in the highly complex and dynamic conditions of contemporary peace operations.

While the effect of the dysfunction between the field and HQ might not be critical when conditions remain stable, Schein points out that when an organization is required to change, when conditions require generative learning in order to adapt to new situations, the internal cultures collide and, "we see frustration, low productivity, and the failure of innovations to survive and diffuse" (Schein, 1996, p. 6). As the DND/CF attempts to adjust its policy, strategy and operations to the changing combat conditions that exist in contemporary conflicts, these culture collisions impact both the internal effectiveness of the DND/CF, and potentially its ability to establish conditions under which it is able to partner with other organizations.

2.1.4   Reward and Status Systems

The majority of participants expressed satisfaction with the manner in which the DND/CF addresses the needs of personnel within the organization. When considering the people with whom they worked, reward systems, lifestyle and job opportunities, interviewees stated that they perceived the experiences offered by employment in the DND/CF as acceptable. Pride in their work, shared vision and values among their colleagues and opportunities unavailable in civilian employment were reported as additional reasons for their satisfaction. Some participants stated that the DND/CF bureaucracy tended to interfere with "the real work." They also stated that while it can be difficult to have unique skills or interests recognized and developed, methods exist to pursue these avenues, if desired. Additionally, interviewees indicated the selection system for officers is designed to round out the individual's work experience, rather than find a job that is suited to an individual's skills or interests. Thus, the structure of the DND/CF officer development system may make it difficult to identify or produce officers capable of filling the complex and critical role of inter-agency interfaces in peacekeeping operations.

HQ and field participants expressed different career path expectations, as well as different measurements of success. In this regard, field level interviewees again expressed distrust towards the underlying ambitions of those in HQ. From the perspective of those in the field, career or personal successes should be measured by accomplishment of tasks. However, they perceived that individuals within HQ may have hidden political or career agendas and feel that this detracts from the values and objectives of the DND/CF. Formal hierarchy may authorize power of those in HQ over those in the field, but the use of this power is subject to interpretation. When interpretation registers power as being used for personal gain, in violation of the military's deeply held cultural values of honour, duty and honesty, trust in leadership is eroded.

2.1.5   Conflict Resolution Systems

The interviews included ranking four potential sources of conflict: disagreement associated with factual information, issues related to values, issues related to personal style, or differences in ways of seeing/defining the issues. Both HQ and field level interviewees chose "differences in ways of seeing or defining the issue" as the most frequent cause of conflict between HQ and field levels. "Differences in values" was the least common area of conflict, although again field participants raised the issue of trust of HQ: suspicion about hidden agendas and ego-driven motives surfaced on several occasions.

Conflict resolution systems within the DND/CF are clear and easily available. Participants stated that the majority of the time, informal methods resolved conflicts. The chain of command is respected as an acceptable method of conflict resolution, and there are also civilian-operated dispute resolution centres available, as well as formal procedures for legal solutions. However, one interviewee commented, "reasonable people won't get to the formal level." Participants overall agreed that the system was good, consistent and that current leadership is approaching this area in a positive manner. An interviewee commented that it is, "disloyal not to come to a resolution, even if it is just, 'yes, sir.'"

2.1.6   Discussion

Within the context of peacekeeping operations, the military is frequently deployed as the first element of an intervention (Durch, 2006). It is arguably the most difficult and dangerous part of an operation, and military forces have adapted their training and procedures to deal with these complex conditions. Heavy cultural indoctrination, a focus on task completion and a reliance on leadership via a rigid chain of command all exist in order to keep soldiers as safe as possible in dangerous conditions. Limitations on "bottom-up" communication and "top-down" dissemination of information as well as conflict resolution that begins and ends with "yes, sir" are also in place to retain clarity of action in complex and fluid combat situations. Field level officers may object to these restrictions, but to paraphrase one HQ level interviewee, "if your soldiers aren't complaining about their commanders, then you know you have trouble." He stated that some of these dynamics such as complaints about HQ officers "forgetting their roots" or "not listening to the common soldier" have been widely voiced by many generations of soldiers.

Whatever the perception of field level personnel, HQ level leadership is not driven only by ego and personal agendas; it must consider wider political ramifications of decisions, as well as financial concerns and accountability. It is fundamentally an executive culture with concerns vastly different from the operator culture. These pressures develop high-level leaders who are cautious and sensitive to political and financial negotiating that must take place, and who are substantially insulated from personal connection to field level "ground truth" while doing so. In other words, they become focused on different objectives than the ones expressed by those in the field and thus may easily be seen by field level officers, who are likewise focused on their own objectives and unaware of the bigger picture, to have "forgotten their roots."

This underlying tension between management cultures may be longstanding and perhaps relatively benign under certain circumstances. However, as Schein states, under the pressure of change, anxiety and resistance to this change may cause substantial cultural conflict in an organization (Schein, 2009). The DND/CF is indeed in the midst of a substantial transformation of doctrine in part as a response to shifting conditions of contemporary peacekeeping operations (National Defence, 2007). The roots of the Canadian military lie in defence of the nation, and subsequently developed into an "alliance of defending the free world against the Soviet menace" (English, 2004). Canada's longstanding reputation as a peacekeeping force was established during a different era of peacekeeping. The transformation from Cold War missions where neutral forces were to contain or cease fighting to complex peace operations that are "multidimensional, multifaceted, and multifunctional" (St. Pierre,

2008, p. 1) stretches the abilities and experience of Canadian military forces, as well as those of other civilian and military actors involved in these operations. Canada's Joint, Interagency, Multi-national and Public approach (JIMP), derived from a whole of government (WoG) policy, requires a higher degree of coordination with, and a deeper understanding of, a wide range of organizations, and organizational cultures, that now inhabit a "crowded battle space" (Simms, 2010, p. 76). Clear leadership, as well as adequate resources and training, will be required to align the existing military HQ and field cultures for this transformation.

This clear leadership may be difficult to attain. A nation's military culture reflects the "society from which it springs" (English, 2004, p. 68). There appears to be deep ambiguity on the part of the Canadian public to have the Canadian military involved in the national disputes of far-off countries and this in turn affects the mandate, policies and the leadership of the DND/CF (For example, Afghanistan Crossroads, 2009). At a time when innovative practices and generative learning may advance much needed knowledge and skills for addressing current day conflicts, the real cost of acquiring the experience that produces such innovative practices, measured in the human dimension by Canadian soldiers injured and killed in the field, exerts a price that the Canadian public may not be willing to shoulder.

The root cause of these internal conflicts between field and HQ levels is not necessarily one merely between subcultures, but may reflect a deep lack of clarity within its highest leadership level, the political level, on the role of the DND/CF and the CF in complex peace operations. Schein states that the "right" culture within an organization is one "that enables the organization to succeed in its primary task and manage its internal relationships" (Schein, 2009, p. 218). Further, he states that as conditions change, both internally and externally, it is up to leadership to manage cultural evolution. It seems possible that the DND/CF lacks a clear primary task, and therefore lacks executive and operator level leadership positioned to manage cultural change. Further, until political leadership and the DND/CF clearly define the role and mandate of the Canadian Forces, internal conflict likely will continue to constrain effective functioning of the DND/CF, and will also likely compromise its capacity to coordinate with external organizations.

2.2   UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO)

The DPKO faces the challenging task of establishing peacekeeping missions that range from complex integrated missions to missions that allow observation only, and do so at the request of the Security Council, according to specific principles and guidelines (Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support, 2009). Each mission must be recruited sui generis, based on its unique circumstances and these guidelines. The voluntary and political nature of each country's participation further complicates the difficult task. From its four main offices, it provides political and strategic policy for UN missions, as well as operational guidance, deployment of military resources, coordination of its rule of law and security activities and development of UN policy and training (About Us, 2011). As of January 31, 2011, there were over 122,000 personnel serving in 15 different DPKO-led peacekeeping operations (Factsheet, 2011). Interviews included the perspectives of HQ/policy level personnel, as well as those who worked with DPKO in the field.

2.2.1   Leadership

Interviewees who worked with the DPKO commented negatively on the bureaucratic nature of the civilian leadership of the organization. HQ directives that a field level participant referred to as "marketing, pure and simple," programs described as "unrealistic," and the perception that HQ [civilians] are more concerned with their paycheques than in-country mission success completed a rather scathing commentary of DPKO HQ by one participant. Further comments by other participants also revealed that a tendency towards an economy of force and mandates that do not reflect the conditions on the ground at times adversely affect missions. Military

leadership of the forces on the ground in-country was reported as "generally good." This participant comment included the abilities of field-level leadership to accommodate inadequately trained military forces and to understand the political aspects of any DPKO mission. At the strategic level, inspirational leaders with exceptional leadership skills were said to be the driving force for successful missions, although participants did not attribute a lack of exceptional leadership skills to any specific mission failure.

2.2.2   Communication

At the headquarters level of DPKO, an interviewee stated that meetings are held once per week, and these meetings are seen to be a valuable resource intended to address critical issues, not merely to "check the boxes" on agenda items. Email was reported as common, and all formal orders and directives as written. A HQ level participant stated a great deal of informal interpersonal communication exists, from pre-meeting off-the-record discussions to "back room" conversations that were stated as necessary to meet objectives. One participant indicated that extensive paperwork and a "procedural morass" might be part of the reason informal interpersonal communication is so important. The extent of this type of communication was said to render directives, for example the Principles and Guidelines Capstone doctrine, "irrelevant in some ways," because personnel "simply decide on the actions they will take within their group, based on their personal judgments."

From the perspective of participants who have worked in the field on DPKO missions, communication was reported to be one way (downwards from DPKO), with little information sharing. An interviewee stated that written reports were filed but commented that only rarely were analyses of these reports revealed, and more rarely still were entire reports made available for review.

A theme expressed by those at all levels was the tremendous amount of latitude for interpretation of the mission mandate. A DPKO participant indicated the significant challenge this created for policy and doctrine within the DPKO. Another interviewee indicated that there was frequently leeway for interpretation between field commanders and those at lower levels, which resulted in platoon-level individuals able to affect division level doctrine with their personal interpretation of it. A field level participant indicated that messages from DPKO often seemed unclear, with a specific message relayed as well as "the spirit of the mission," which implied there was "room to do more" at the field level, even if it exceeded the mission mandate or the law, at the discretion of the force commander.

2.2.3   Organizational Culture

One participant described the DPKO organizational culture as one of secrecy and zero transparency, where reports are written but never disseminated to others. It was also described as a "culture of caution: a combination of timidity with unrealistic altruism." The enterprise of peacekeeping at the DPKO is by its particular nature unique and each mission must be recruited and developed to suit these unique needs. According to an interviewee, until the creation of 2008's Principles and Guidelines Capstone doctrine, the DPKO operated on the individual dedication and leadership of the people on the ground. The purpose of the Capstone doctrine was to reflect core policies and procedures, to "professionalize" peacekeeping to the point where DPKO would be able to capitalize on institutional knowledge and memory from different missions, a key capacity that interviewees stated is currently missing from the organization. A cultural change on a large scale seems to be in progress, as the DPKO attempts to transform from a personality-operated organization to one where professionalism, consistency and some degree of standardization can offer realistic expectations of DPKO mission assistance and results to countries in need, member countries donating personnel and the public.

The combination of poor two-way communication between field commanders and executives at DPKO, latitude for interpretation of the mission, as well as the sui generis mission construction contribute to an organizational culture that has few clear, common objectives. A bureaucratic culture at the executive level clashes with the realities faced by personnel in the field, especially in contemporary environments of intra-state conflict. Faced with complexities encountered by few other organizations, the DPKO is also faced with challenges common to any large organization. Schein's organizational theory provides a framework from which the DPKO may advantageously develop its intra-organizational impetus for change, as outlined in the Capstone doctrine, to instil a culture of the "professional peacekeeper." Where the sui generis creation of each mission is often seen as a disadvantage, it may be used strategically if each new mission is able to provide opportunity to establish norms and, upon completion, record effective and ineffective strategies. New missions may then integrate or adapt effective strategies. A more coherent internal mandate may enable DPKO to work more effectively with other organizations.

2.2.4   Reward and Status Systems

Interviewees commented that the DPKO does not adequately address the needs of its people in terms of career path, job security or effectively using the skills and experience of available personnel. The nature of peacekeeping operations, as previously described, means that when missions end, need for mission employees also ends. Personnel at DPKO are for the large part contract workers who must re-apply for their posts every six or twelve months. According to a participant, these short term contracts lack benefits and job security, and result in the frequent loss of good personnel. Institutional learning is negatively impacted by high turnover, as knowledgeable personnel depart with valuable experience and information. Lack of job security was defined as a tremendous challenge for DPKO and no indication of improvement or change in this area was mentioned.

2.2.5   Conflict Resolution Systems

With regard to conflict resolution, one frustration outlined by a participant was that problematic issues repeated because they were managed, not resolved. This participant commented that this perspective is part of the culture: "the sui generis nature [of the work done] is built into the institution itself," which results in issues being managed ad hoc until the mission is completed, at which time they are no longer an issue. There are clear formal directives on this area, however a participant commented that conflict resolution might in reality vary from professional mutual respect to "just shut up and do what you are told." Minimal data was collected on the conflict resolution systems of the DPKO, as participants seemed either unclear about the policies or disinclined to discuss the topic. It would appear conflict resolution systems lack consistency, which may reflect the effect of fluid, short-term contract peacekeeping work, its multicultural nature or other factors not apparent within the context of this research.

2.2.6   Discussion

The interviews with those within the DPKO at the HQ policy level and those who have worked within a DPKO field mission surfaced observations in three main areas. First, a lack of clear leadership from the highest levels causes conflict at the field level. Within field levels of DPKO missions, this lack of clarity appears to have left too much room for adaptation based on personal judgment, to the point where actions may breech both law and mission mandate. There is also *expectation* of said adaptation: the "spirit of the mission." Shifting mandates and fluid conditions in the field result in mission adjustments, which contribute to conflict between the different cultures: the HQ, which has control of the policy, scale and mandate of the mission, and the field which has to adapt these restrictions to ground conditions. Such a significant misalignment across cultures and subcultures leaves this organization with conditions that indicate continued and significant conflict between the cultures (Schein, 2009, p. 23).

Second, as with the DND/CF, the DPKO HQ is not always able to authorize or obtain sufficient resources (troops, equipment, information), either for the mandate or for the reality of need on the ground, as perceived at the field level. Missions that include troops from multiple nations, political negotiations by member countries, pressure from local elites and by a vocal and critical global public, among many factors, complicate matters further for the DPKO. Finally, conflict between the field and HQ levels also appears to develop out of a lack of communication from HQ. Its political and bureaucratic culture and its lack of transparency also create divisions and a lack of trust from those in the field.

According to some interviewees, changes are underway to professionalize the efforts of the DPKO, to better capture lessons learned from previous missions, and to establish best practices. However, neglect of problems outlined above will likely undermine these efforts. The DPKO will continue to lose valuable institutional knowledge along with good personnel if it is unable to address these organizational issues. Finally, where DPKO missions continue to rely upon the operators, the in-field, inspirational leaders, to conduct operations so distinctly detached from the mandate of HQ, intra-organization conflict will remain, and detract from operational success.

2.3   CARE International (CARE)

CARE International is a confederation of twelve country member organizations, each autonomous and as such the organization does not have centralized coordination through to each CARE country office. It employs more than 11,500 people and operates in over 70 countries (About CARE, n.d.). The CARE International Secretariat works from Geneva with other representation offices in order to coordinate the work of CARE members in development areas and during humanitarian disasters (Structure, n.d.). All of the offices have their own objectives, within a broad range of actions set forth by CARE International, which are in turn established to meet donor objectives. Interviews included individuals with experience both in the field and at an executive level, and from the field level.

2.3.1   Leadership

A participant stated that executives in headquarters accept that they do not have answers for all issues faced by those in the field and allow field operators to "make the calls" in-country. An in-field interviewee confirmed this comment, stating that the management of the Country Directors will "make or break" a country office: their attitude and leadership skills drive the culture within a country office. They are reported to vary from extremely manipulative and aggressive, to professional and well trained. It was noted that leadership is a challenge within CARE as there is a lack of time and effort spent developing this fundamental skill set. A participant commented that in CARE, a leader is considered a leader after a decade of work with the organization, without regard for specific training or by showing specific or exceptional leadership skills. An interviewee indicated that CARE is a personality-run organization, with personal networks driving changes and policy. The "old boys network" was specifically mentioned as a divisive force in the organization, and one that new employees were attempting to change, with difficulty.

Originally, CARE International was created as an aid organization. A participant noted that a significant transformation occurred in CARE USA, with a change in mandate from "aid only" to a focus on human rights. Executive levels spent approximately three years on dialogue to ensure a common understanding of such a significant change of policy, however an interviewee stated that many in the field did not come to agreement with this move to a human rights focus, and that this continues to be a source of conflict within the organization.

As a final point, a participant noted that there is such physical distance from the executive level to any country office, and therefore there is ample opportunity for the Country Directors to continue to operate according to their personal agendas. The participant stated this encouraged a pervasive culture of "working under the radar" with the attitude of "it is easier to apologize than ask permission."

2.3.2 Communication

Participants commented that time zone differences and the heavy use of email contributed to problems of communication between executive levels and the field. According to one interviewee, communication was sometimes, "a bit of a mess… nasty, and frustrating" to the extent that those in the field would ignore communication from higher levels. Perception in the field was that they were extremely busy and stressed already, and that HQ often interrupted with what it considered important information, but which those in the field did not consider important. While the field participants recognized that HQ had different concerns, which they understood may affect activity in the country office, unless the field and HQ members had a good personal relationship, the field personnel were unlikely to consider these concerns and quite likely to ignore communications from HQ whenever possible. CARE's geographically isolated teams appeared to develop their own country office cultures, described as significantly different from the HQ level culture. While HQ may strive for dialogue within all levels of the organization, the competing demands of the field and HQ contribute to each viewing their own positions as more important to the organization.

2.3.3 Organizational Culture

CARE International is a large organization that has been in existence for 65 years. It began as an organization dedicated to providing food aid in Europe during the Second World War. Following a US-led initiative, it has made a substantial change of policy in recent years, to include advocacy for human rights in addition to supplying aid to people in need. Change within the organizational culture is moving more slowly. A participant described a "culture of the missionary" that exists within the organization, in which those at the top perceive a moral authority to say who will be "saved" by CARE actions. The interviews revealed that conflict within the executive levels is overwhelmingly about issues of values, as opposed to over facts, personal styles or differences in the way the issue is perceived. Conflict over values may be difficult to resolve as it reflects deeply ingrained ethical concerns, which, in comparison to conflict over facts or personal styles may have few options for compromise or accommodation of alternate views.

Within the country offices, an interviewee stated that the overall feeling for field personnel is that they are "outsiders," and they are highly aware of this and how their offices work, as a result of this status. The culture in this area is one of "get the job done, but don't get caught" and that good results will make up for the manner in which they were accomplished. In fact, the pressure to produce good results for HQ combined with the personal moral obligation of field personnel to accomplish objectives sometimes resulted in false reporting to hide or exaggerate the manner in which objectives were met, in order to ensure the methods and results were acceptable to reviews at headquarters. An interview reported that this attitude of "don't get caught" has permeated the culture of the field and has adverse effects on effective coordination between field and the executive levels.

2.3.4 Reward and Status Systems

While there are many career CARE personnel, due to the nature of contract work between country offices and donors, according to interviewees, the threat of layoff as projects near completion causes a "siege mentality" to exist within the organization. An interviewee reported that a Performance Management System, meant to accurately evaluate personnel, has become a subjective but critical aspect of the system of promotion and

compensation. Evaluations may be less than honest because of their close relationship with compensation. This has resulted in specific programs being represented as successful so the people involved will receive a raise, regardless of the actual success of the programs. This misalignment between what work is done, what is reported and what is rewarded may detract from efforts to coordinate between HQ and field levels, as well as encourage a hostile and competitive work environment.

2.3.5   Conflict Resolution Systems

An interviewee reported that formal conflict resolution systems are poorly developed within CARE, and commented that "there is no pattern to the way it is handled" in either the field or executive level. In the field, a typical resolution of conflict between personnel might simply be an informal conversation, with the intervention of a supervisor, if needed. There is a sense that there is more important work to do, and a disinclination to focus on conflict as it wastes the time of already busy people.

At the executive level, conflict resolution forums such as equity workshops exist, but the climate of the organization encourages conflict to be downplayed or avoided. In general, within the NGO there is a sense that "if you don't get along with someone, there is something wrong with you" and that the existence of conflict is a poor reflection on the individuals involved. Between the field and executive levels, an interviewee reported the time pressures, lack of education, open interpretation or lack of information (unclear or nonexistent communications) all exacerbate an underlying pathos between the field and executive levels. It was also noted that the western culture of the executives does not take into account differences in how other cultures address conflict and conflict resolution.

2.3.6   Discussion

This preliminary inquiry into such a large and geographically dispersed organization offers many areas of interest for further research. While this current study may not be sufficiently comprehensive to draw firm conclusions, some of the observations made by participants indicate areas where OD theory may provide insight into issues of intra-organizational coordination.

In order to remain relevant in the fields of development and humanitarian work, CARE must be able to integrate its internal culture with the demands of contemporary conditions (Schein, 1997). Schein cites the need for groups within an organization to create a shared mission as a survival strategy. Where CARE has changed its focus to human rights advocacy from a strictly humanitarian focus without engaging all levels of its members, it has lost consensus on its overall mission and moved away from existing shared assumptions about the role of the organization.

As Schein stated, an organization that wishes to learn and innovate in order to remain competitive must not punish unsuccessful attempts at innovation. CARE's executive level of leadership rarely rewards innovation, and may in fact punish it, a strategy that likely negatively affects relationships between HQ and field levels at CARE. According to one interviewee, while continuing to excel in the area of disaster relief, CARE is in danger of becoming irrelevant in the field of development. Its inability to learn from past experiences has left the organization slow to adapt to the changing nature of development work.

Increasing interaction between the levels may encourage each level to acquire an understanding and appreciation of the pressures exacted by other level of the organization. As well, development of skills such as leadership and conflict management via cross-sectoral training may aid in understanding that issues between field and HQ levels are a natural, and manageable, effect of differing objectives, not an issue exclusive to any particular organization.

2.4   Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA)

At the time of writing, CIDA was "Canada's lead agency for development assistance" (About CIDA, 2011). Administered by the Minister of International Cooperation, the organization was engaged in developing policy and managing resources in the areas of food security, children and youth and economic growth programs in 20 "focus countries." CIDA had 1500 employees, with approximately 81% of those employees at the Ottawa headquarters (Carin & Smith, 2010, p. 3). Interviewees included individuals who had experience in CIDA at the executive level, and those who had worked with CIDA in the field, both implementing CIDA projects and in the military sector. In June 2013, CIDA was merged with the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, both of which now operate as the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development (About CIDA, 2013).

2.4.1   Leadership

With regard to CIDA leadership, a participant commented that its political nature causes critical decisions to be made at a political, not field, level. Comments also focused on the bureaucratic nature of CIDA leadership, which was defined more accurately as management, as opposed to leadership. The participant questioned if bureaucratic analysis is sufficient to make decisions that are enacted in risky contemporary peace operations such as Afghanistan. A participant commented that CIDA needs leaders who will rely on analysis from country-level personnel, in order to make decisions that reflect work CIDA can in fact accomplish. As well, an interviewee noted that even when the field level analysis is reported to CIDA, questions often remain about whether or not this information is pushed up the hierarchy to politicians, and whether the political leadership has the capacity to inquire into and address the deeper regional and global issues.

CIDA leadership changes with the government of the day. This "revolving door" style of leadership means that the agendas on the ground change as well, and an interviewee commented that this detrimentally affects programs. There is no clear mandate or rules: the organization continues to re-invent itself, and to do so idiosyncratically, based on the agenda of each current minister. Further interviewee comments questioned if peacebuilding is the driving issue for CIDA, if the current political leadership was capable of looking deeply enough at the root issues that need to be addressed, and if leadership was capable of assessing the increased risks to development personnel if this is or becomes the focus of CIDA.

As with other agencies, interviewees emphasized the need for HQ level decision makers to spend time in the field. A participant noted that successful conditions of coordination between CIDA and another agency occurred when CIDA senior management went to the field on a regular basis and did not attempt to operate from the "Ottawa bubble." Without this visceral understanding of field conditions, an interviewee described the disconnect from policy to field as too great and stated it seriously undermines the impact of projects in the field.

2.4.2   Communication

Participants outlined interactions with CIDA in several different contexts: that of an emergency response, personnel within a long-term project and as contractor of CIDA-designed projects to other agencies. In all contexts, participants were resolute in their statements that direct and consistent communication between the field and headquarters was vital to success. This communication included a participant's recommendation of significant time in the field by headquarters personnel, in order to facilitate the exchange of information and clarity in project objectives. In the field, where CIDA personnel and those from other organizations live and work together, communication is facilitated and enhanced by this constant interaction. Under other circumstances, communication varies according to the project leaders, who may be helpful or interfere negatively with the projects.

Within levels at CIDA, email is used regularly. When the communications require secure transmission, such as some circumstances in Afghanistan, technical issues hamper easy communication. Budgetary restrictions limit secure computer access and further hamper frequency of communication as well as efficient use of time and resources. This effort spent in communicating was reported to detract significantly from time that would otherwise be spent on analysis or consultation.

2.4.3   Organizational Culture

The culture at CIDA was described as poor by one participant, non-existent by another and by a third as a "culture of career bureaucrats." It was stated that CIDA has never tried to cultivate any culture other than bureaucratic, and no commonly known story of a past or present inspirational leader exists. Further, an interviewee stated that CIDA does not foster a culture of development or humanitarian work because the personnel are not development-oriented. The cultural mindset was further described as "contract-based:" as a culture revolving around the details of contracts or projects and the disbursement of money, with an attitude that "they are doing good by throwing money around." Financial accountability was described as paramount and this pressure as pervasive throughout the organization.

Participants selected "differences in the way headquarters and the field see the issue" as the most frequent source of conflict between the two levels. With part of the organization primarily concerned with the disbursement of funding while other groups are highly engaged in, but not necessarily trained for, management of projects in high-risk field environments, CIDA displays a misaligned organizational culture that lacks coherent objectives, an atmosphere identified by Schein as likely to cause inefficiencies and conflict (Schein, 2009).

2.4.4   Reward and Status Systems

Participants commented that CIDA does not address the needs of its personnel well, and that it has been struggling with this issue for about 10 years. There is lack of knowledge regarding the experience available within its own personnel, and CIDA lacks a system to harness the lessons already learned. There is little organizational memory. Participants also noted that CIDA's large bureaucracy is not able to use experienced people effectively. Nor is it able to conceptualize the idea of aid as a tool for social change: this was described as a concept beyond the education level of the average bureaucrat within CIDA. Related to this point, a participant stated that there is no reward structure for the manner in which objectives are accomplished, and that the performance assessment system needs to include and reflect this important factor, as well as CIDA's values system and leadership principles.

CIDA is a civil service organization, not necessarily one in which people aspire to put their lives at risk in the conditions that exist within contemporary peace operations. An interviewee reported that the changing policies regarding work within failed or failing states have become an issue for CIDA personnel and the organization has been looking into the impact of this different policy. It was observed that little support exists for people who go into risky field conditions, although some changes have happened recently. Finally, an interviewee commented that the reintegration of field personnel is also not well addressed. The difficult transition from in-field work back into deskwork requires appropriate de-briefing, as would be common with Canadian Forces personnel returning from combat conditions, but which is not available within CIDA.

2.4.5   Conflict Resolution Systems

A field participant commented that HQ lacks understanding that "development work is risky and does not necessarily work out" [as originally planned on paper]. From the perspective of those in the field, this lack of

understanding leads to needless and frustrating conflict when implementation of a project does not produce the expected results, or when additional funds are requested to adjust to changing field circumstances.

From the perspective of a participant who worked alongside CIDA personnel in the field, CIDA personnel were described as skilled, knowledgeable and professional, and tended to have a solid perspective about [inter-personal] conflicts, and a sense of immediacy about resolving issues and moving on. For those within CIDA headquarters in Ottawa, or who work with CIDA bureaucrats, there are tools available to use, such as a "wellness centre" and these tools and the levels of authority are used to resolve conflicts. A participant noted that these formal systems of conflict resolution do not work well with hierarchical conflict, and that a formal outside system is needed to prevent the serious abuses of power that occur within CIDA senior management. Instead of going through more formal channels, this interviewee stated that informal, trusted personal relationships are used to resolve personality conflicts, as senior management is unlikely to step in when required.

2.4.6   Discussion

With a constantly changing political leadership, CIDA's tightly controlled bureaucratic culture struggles with a mandate of development that requires both a more flexible and focused approach. It has not adapted to changing policies and practices for development, nor effectively harnessed valuable lessons learned in the field. Coordination between HQ and the field is hampered by vastly different objectives: those in the field who attempt to address the needs on the ground, and those in the bureaucracy who closely guard their project objectives and financial disbursements, regardless of useful adaptations which might increase results for projects over a longer term. HQ personnel trained for deskwork lack the capacity to effectively assess innovative adaptations and CIDA's many levels of hierarchy distance HQ further from engagement in needed dialogue with field personnel.

The beleaguered organization is the subject of an 82-page report entitled "Reinventing CIDA," produced by the Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute in May 2010 (Carin & Smith, 2010). According to the report, it is an organization that indeed needs to reinvent itself. It must do so with the help of much needed recommendations on what it needs to change in order to accomplish its development objectives. As important as what it needs to change is how it will accomplish these changes. Guidance from the field of organization development (OD) would be a useful aid for leadership, to help frame these substantial transformations. The cultural changes will require a significant adaptation of deep underlying assumptions, norms, habits and values across all subcultures of the organization.

3.0   INTRA-ORGANIZATIONAL OBSERVATIONS

While a broad spectrum of challenges hinder effective intra-agency relationships, OD theory and practice offers tools to enhance internal effectiveness for organizations involved in contemporary peace building. Inasmuch as these organizations are akin to organizations providing products or services to consumer markets, in order to be successful within their field, they must also provide for their employees the basics that are the foundation of a well-run organization: clear leadership, satisfactory communication, a coherent culture, appropriate financial and psychological compensation, and mechanisms for resolution of conflict within the organization. The absence of these abilities may negatively affect the ability of an organization to fulfil its internal objectives, as well as affect its ability to partner or coordinate with other organizations.

Cross-organizational themes, listed below, emerged from the analysis of interviewee information. This current study provides a comprehensive look within the perspectives of the participants and allows firm conclusions to be drawn from the depth of the interviews conducted. There is good reason to believe the themes identified are generalizable and have identified some core issues within these, and similar, organizations.

3.1   Knowing Coordination When You See It.

This research identified a need to more precisely define coordination between HQ and the field within organizations: a clear understanding of an objective is paramount to its accomplishment. Each organization must answer the question of what constructive coordination is, precisely, within the organization. Additionally, the objective of coordination, if it is truly an objective of the organization, needs to be made concrete. Questions need to be investigated: is coordination within the capacity and willingness of the organization? Are the cultures within the organization willing and able to align possibly "incompatible priorities and strategic orientations" (Paris 2008, p. 60) to produce a more efficient, coordinated result with other sectors or agencies?   Are HQ and field personnel in the organization prepared and capable of working in a complex and crowded contemporary peace operation? These questions need to be assessed and coordination must be included a feature of the organization's mission, defined and included deliberately as an undertaking for the organization's personnel.

Schein (1993) refers to the "essential coordination problem" (p. 27) as a lack of integration across subcultures. Where day-to-day experiences differ substantially between cultures in an organization, such as for the HQ and field interviewees as outlined in this study, Schein notes there is an increase in the creation of subcultures. This increasing number of subcultures further exacerbates the difficulties in integrating clear objectives throughout an organization: different assumptions and even different values between the subcultures may reduce the possibility of shared objectives. A clear definition of coordination and its formal inclusion as part of an organization's mission statement will aid in integrating the concept across subcultures of an organization.

3.2   Recognition and Resolution of Conflict.

Interactions between HQ and field levels, as well as between subcultures will on many occasions result in conflict. Differences in perceptions of issues, underlying values, interpretation of facts and personal styles are but a few of the areas in which conflict may occur. Organizations must have the capacity to recognize, and be prepared to manage, conflict when it appears. This capacity requires training and conflict management mechanisms. The marked lack of consistent conflict resolution mechanisms within CIDA, the DPKO and CARE may, according to the literature, cause a reduction in productivity and allow unresolved conflict to worsen. Interviewee comments such as, "we are too busy to deal with personal conflict" and, "if you don't get along with someone, there is something wrong with you" provide insight into the values and perceptions of the interviewees.   This type of knowledge is invaluable to the leadership of an organization: a reluctance to recognize and deal with conflict may negatively affect productivity and internal coordination of organizational objectives. In organizations already stretched for time and resources, improved conflict resolution training would help produce improved relationships, allow for more in-depth discussion, and likely result in quicker and higher-quality decisions.

3.3   Reward and Status Systems.

A need to professionalize and to perhaps standardize career paths emerged. While personnel may be sufficiently compensated for their work, the short-term nature of tours, projects and contracts increases turnover of personnel and a concomitant loss of institutional knowledge when skilled and experienced people depart. A requirement to repeatedly justify short-term or contract employment in order to ensure future work also detracts from capacity to concentrate on the difficult work these jobs require.

It is also imperative that the reward systems provide incentive for personnel to accomplish the organization's objectives. Executive/HQ levels need to assess what outcomes they reward, and how they reward innovative or successful outcomes as well as the consequences for failures. In this way the requirement to define coordination,

set concrete steps to accomplish coordinated actions and then properly reward these actions provides a broad framework in which the actual work of the organization can be accomplished in a coordinated manner, and this collective success can also be clearly rewarded.

3.4   Contemporary Conflict Conditions.

While not a specific inquiry of this research, participants across all four organizations commented on the need to address the new threats and personal liability inherent in contemporary peace operations and the impact of these changing environments on humanitarian, security and development organizations. For example with CARE, the switch from providing food aid to the "Change Starts with a Girl" campaign (About CARE, n.d.) may put the actions of field workers in conflict with local customs or laws in countries where reaction to such interventions may be hostile or violent. Personnel who have sought employment with the desire to simply provide aid to those in need may not be familiar with or prepared for such conditions in the field. Vastly different daily working conditions in the field and at HQ distance these levels significantly, and leadership with experience in the field would likely benefit those organizations where it is lacking. Transitions to and reintegration from the field would improve with cross-sectoral training and preparation as well as consideration of mental and physical demands.

3.5   Consider Available Tools.

The use of OD theory may help executive or HQ levels "learn how to learn," in order to have the ability to analyze and take advantage of the strengths of particular organizational cultures and to best benefit the organization and its objectives. Self-analysis at the HQ level, in order to understand strengths, and to improve weaknesses must precede attempts at organizational change in order to be successful (Schein, 1993). Cross-cultural professional development, which may also include members from different organizations training and learning together, may aid in understanding differing cultures, strategies and assumptions. For example, field training in the DND/CF encourages a culture of "task first, relationship second." This may be an effective way to ensure DND/CF objectives are met, but this unique approach to relationships may be a negative factor when these personnel attempt to work with other agencies, whose personnel may prefer to build relationships first, for example, prior to setting out tasks. Information such as this is vital when different cultures, whether intra- or inter-organizational, attempt to coordinate to accomplish a collective goal. Schein encourages learning "structured along industry lines through consortia of learners rather than along individual organizational lines" (Schein, 1996, p. 19). This would require understanding that peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations include not only coordination of efforts, but also coordination of learning. In this case, further investigation into the impact of OD on organizational learning, in order to create a culture of learning between the diverse actors involved in complex peace operations, may aid in uncovering innovative ways to enhance coordination.

3.6   Engage, Through Better Communication.

Communication between those in the field and those in headquarters or executive levels of the organizations needs to be timely, efficient and reliable. Time, or the lack of it, is in myriad ways a significant impediment to good communication. This might be seen in quick decisions made without sufficient discussion, or by "small" violations of cultural norms that undermine relationships (Schein, 1993). Dependence on email as the primary communication tool, while seemingly a tool to enhance contact between the field and HQ, may contribute to poor communication and increased conflict between these personnel. Face-to-face meetings are vital for good relationships between levels and these good relationships contribute to efficient and effective completion of objectives. However, the quality of face-to-face communications may also suffer due to bureaucratic scuffles, political manoeuvring or simple time pressures. According to Schein (1993), in order to provide solutions to

problems, or perhaps at the least a cross-level or cross-sectoral understanding of what the problems are, valid communication must be developed. Valid communication involves groups and individuals learning to understand and interact despite different assumptions, rules and norms, which may otherwise cause conflict between their cultures and subcultures.

3.7   Dialogue, to Begin.

Tension and differences between cultures and subcultures must not simply be considered "the way things are" and left at the status quo. Schein outlines a pressing need for these differences to be taken seriously and recommends the process of dialogue to address it (Schein, 1993). Dialogue is a specific technique that involves the use of active listening and self-analysis to establish shared meanings and a common thinking process within a group. Dialogue explores underlying assumptions, to reveal how thought processes work and to encourage learning and building common ground within a group (Schein 1993, pp. 29-32). With reference to the preceding points regarding the definition of coordination and its execution between levels in organizations, dialogue is necessary to further the "case for coordination" and to move beyond barriers such as misaligned cultures or inter-personal conflicts. Dialogue may help leaders first outline what effective coordination is, for the organization. Integrating this coordination objective across subcultures will require "buy-in" from leadership positions. Leadership must first acknowledge the need for self-analysis, in order to clearly outline the current state of the organization, and then move to define steps that will lead to the organization's desired state: efficient and constructive coordination of HQ and field objectives. Only with this basic clarity established should an organization's leadership look outward to working with other organizations in conditions so complex as contemporary peace operations.

4.0   CONCLUSION

This work applied Organization Development theory to examine five characteristic organizational dynamics: leadership, communication, organizational culture, reward/status systems, and conflict resolution systems, with the objective to assess their relationship with intra-organizational coordination. Elements such as overwhelming task complexity, difficult logistical and geographical allocation of resources, diverse cultures and languages, and conflicts over deeply held values encompass but a few of the challenges to coordination for organizations working within complex peace operations. In pursuit of improved outcomes, it is important that organizations examine their internal cultures to assess what conditions may contribute to or detract from intra-agency coordination. It may be that there are elements within an organization's leadership, culture or reward/status systems that are barriers to efficient functioning and internal coordination. Thorough analysis of the cultures and subcultures within an organization will aid in understanding how different norms, values and assumptions affect its objectives and outcomes. This internal assessment will help to clearly define the current state of an organization, and from there to decide where it would like to be; its "desired state."

It is imperative that each organization position itself for success with internal coordination prior to attempting coordination with other organizations. Once this has been accomplished, the same, deliberate approach must then be applied looking outward, at the inter-agency level. Each organization must define its own roadmap for success, in order to close the gap between the current and desired states. It is not the intention of this work to advise on prescriptive improvements for the specific organizations studied. The outcome of this research is to highlight that a quest for inter-organizational coordination will be well served by the systematic employment of organization development theories and tools in service of transformative change, as well as considerable in-depth intra-organizational analysis on the part of those organizations involved in this daunting task. For peace practitioners, the reality remains simply and well stated by Anderson and Olsen (2003), "so long as people continue to suffer the consequences of unresolved conflicts, there is urgency for everyone to do better" (p. 10).

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